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Abstract. The vision of the Grid is one of seamless, virtual and constantly changing 
resources where users need not concern themselves about details, such as exactly where an 
application is running or where their data is being stored. However, seamless and virtual often 
imply a lack of control that users may be wary of, or even opposed to. Drawing upon our 
studies of HCI and of collaborative work, this paper examines whether the Grid development 
community should be taking this vision literally and argues for the need for accountability of 
systems ‘in interaction’. We give examples of an alternative approach that seeks to provide 
ways in which administrators, technical support and user communities can make sense of the 
behaviour of the complex socio-technical ensembles that are the reality of Grids. 
Introduction 
In ‘The Grid: Blueprint for a New Computing Infrastructure’, Kesselman and Foster (1998) 
defined a computational Grid to be “a hardware and software infrastructure that provides 
dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end computational 
capabilities.” This, in turn, has been likened to providing a utility service, such as electricity 
where a user doesn’t specify whether their current comes from a nuclear power plant or wind 
farm1, a Grid user will simply plug into their “Grid port” on the wall and have access to as 
much compute and data resource as needed. “This idea is analogous to electric power network 
(grid) where power generators are distributed, but the users are able to access electric power 
without bothering about the source of energy and its location.”2 
Currently, this vision is still far off: today’s Grids do not reach this level of abstraction. In 
most cases, compute resources a user needs must be specified, data must be named by a 
physical file name and explicitly transferred, and the authorization and authentication 
framework needed to enable these interactions is quite lengthy and often onerous. 
Nevertheless, the Grid is often promoted as a seamless, virtual and dynamically changing 
resource, where users will have no need to concern themselves with details such as where 
their applications are running, who is providing the services they are using, exactly what state 
their data is in, or low level issues of control3, and research to reach the goal of a completely 
virtual and seamless environment continues.  
                                                 
1 Green consumers may want to know and, in some cases they are now being offered the choice. 
2 http://www.gridcomputing.com 
3 Except as specified in Service Level Agreements (SLAs). SLAs are … 
Drawing upon our studies of Human-Computer Interaction and of collaborative work, we 
argue that it is not clear that seamlessness is what users want from the Grid: taking 
seamlessness literally means users must sacrifice the ability to exercise control (Hardian et 
al., 2006) and to make systems accountable ‘in interaction’. We do not deny that users benefit 
from abstractions in that they protect users from unnecessary details. These abstractions must, 
however, work at differing levels, for different types of users and be queryable on demand so 
that users can understand system behaviour and determine appropriate courses of action 
should problems arise. This is what we refer to as providing accountability in interaction. As 
evidence, we give examples of how control and accountability in interaction is played out in 
similar environments. We then examine accountability issues as they arise in Grid 
environments, focusing in particular on Grid as an enabler of e-Research whose own vision is 
of distributed, large scale collaboration conducted through the agency of ‘virtual 
organisations’ (VOs) which determine policies for sharing resources between participating 
administrative domains. We conclude by considering ways in which accountability may be 
delivered in Grid environments, exploring how data about Grid and user behaviour can be 
mined, organised and visualised in appropriate ways to provide accountability to different 
user communities, i.e., VO administrators, Grid support staff and end users of different levels 
of sophistication. 
Our approach is to examine how users of Grids generate data as a by product of their 
activities (i.e., system-system, system-user, user-system, user-user interactions) and explore 
how this data can be mined, organised and visualised in appropriate ways to provide 
accountability to different user communities, for example, Grid administrators, technical 
support staff and end users of different levels of sophistication. In this paper we will discuss 
how this might be done, giving examples of the kinds of data that can be mined and how we 
can utilise them to afford awareness and accountability. In addition, we will look at the ways 
in which people can use the resources so provided to furnish accounts of a system’s workings 
and people’s activities within a virtual organisation. 
Accounts and Accountability: Initial Problem Statement  
When we look at the kinds of information that systems provide of their operations we can, 
quite obviously, state that this falls well short of the kinds of accounts that we would expect 
our colleagues and friends to give if, for example, they were late to a meeting or similar. We 
must, therefore, say that what systems provide are not accounts but the resources for the 
assembly of accounts by humans – that what a system does is to furnish resources as opposed 
to accounts. Now that may seem to be being overly careful regarding the choice of 
terminology – indeed it may be seen by some as a terminological quibble of little 
consequence – yet we want to argue that the gap between the systems’ provision of resources 
for assembling accounts and accounts of what the system is doing is key to our understanding 
of grid usability4.  
Claims that the Grid is a way of looking anew at data and computational resource-sharing are 
undermined if, to put it bluntly, we do not know what on earth the system is doing. How can 
we trust a system whose only indications that something may be awry either in terms of 
software or security is opaque for many users? The cognoscenti may suggest opening up 
                                                 
4 There is, of course, an argument that systems provide something very close to accounts – a claim often heard in strong AI 
or similar circles. We would dispute that, despite their apparent proximity to accounts, these are not accounts in themselves 
but at best proxies for or simulations of accounts. We shall take this up below.  
firewalls and ports and using this or that service or similar, but unless we know what the 
consequences of these actions might be we risk some unpleasant surprises5.   
To clarify this issue we shall use the following nomenclature: while what systems do is an 
accountable matter, but we shall refer to the information that systems provide as ‘account 
resources6’ and ‘accounts’ to refer to what humans do with these. Thus, if my system is 
running slowly that is an accountable matter (I want to know why) and I may query my 
system and obtain some indication of the issue (the account resource) which I will then 
mention in, for example, my discussion with technical support personnel and in deciding 
what is happening and what to do about it 
In what follows we will look at the ways that systems provide information on what they do 
and how these can be used in the assembly of accounts.    
The Web 
The Web is often held up as a usability benchmark for the Grid. People point to the Web’s 
transparency as one of the key reasons behind its global adoption and reason that the Grid 
must similarly succeed in having seemless use if it is to make the transition from a tool for 
technically able users to a tool for the average researcher. However, the assumptions about 
Web use which have inspired this aim do not bear close scrutiny. In the early days of the 
Web, especially, the abstraction of a seamless, distributed information space where the 
location of resources is irrelevant was rarely sustained in practice (Johnson, nnnn).  
The globally distributed nature of Web resources and the character of the underlying internet 
can combine to create unpredictable delays as requested pages and files download. Users are 
observed to deal with this behaviour in various resourceful ways which call upon, for 
example, an understanding of how the technology behind the browser works or reasoning 
about the effects of temporal rhythms in internet use (Stanyer and Procter, 1999). It was 
common, for example, to observe users reloading a web page when progress was slow in the 
belief that a faster connection to the host server might thereby be obtained. While it might be 
true that getting a faster connection is not what happens, there are a number of possible 
reasons why hitting the reload button may solve the problem of request being stalled, e.g. 
getting a connection to a different server in a load-balanced environment. While the 
explanation of the system's behaviour may not be technically correct, the heuristic employed 
is suitable in the case of a short transaction like a request for a webpage. However, in the case 
of longer-running or more expensive transactions, simply restarting is not an option and 
hence there is a greater need for the system to provide more account resources. In these and 
other examples, we see how the behaviour of the Web becomes an ‘accountable’ matter in 
use, reflecting the importance of providing explanations for ‘why things are this way’ that 
enable users to deal with problems.  
Web browser user interfaces have generally fallen short in regard to making download 
behaviour accountable, preferring to stick to the abstraction of a seamless information space 
and advances in network bandwidths, the use of ‘mirror’ sites, etc., may have rendered this 
aspect of Web behaviour irrelevant. However, as the Web is put to new uses, then new 
accountability issues are now beginning to emerge, some of which are still technical in 
nature, while others reflect the Web’s evolution into a populated, collaborative, social space 
                                                 
5 This is not to be alarmist – what is at stake ranges inter alia from significant security issues to a system not working 
reliably.   
6 For want of a better term. We shall also have cause to distinguish between a number of ‘levels’ of these.  
in which people do business, interact and strike up relationships. These new accountability 
issues reflect users need to have answers to questions about relevance, quality, security, 
identity and trust: does this link take me to a Web page with the information I’m looking for? 
Is the content of sufficient quality? Is it safe to send my credit card details? How can I verify 
the identity of a Web site or an individual? How can I tell if this email is really from my bank 
or if this download is what it claims to be?  
All of these questions make for the Web becoming less rather than more seamless and have 
led to the devising of new ways to make the experience of using it more accountable. 
Google’s success in the search engine market owes a lot to its approach to the relevance 
question as applied to the ordering of search hits, one which is simple enough for most users 
to understand; Amazon, like many e-commerce sites, uses purchaser ratings7 to advise 
potential customers of what products to buy; eBay provides information to potential buyers 
about sellers’ track record in completing deals and recently bought the Voice Over IP 
company Skype allegedly so its buyers and sellers can talk to each other via their computers.8  
The Grid 
The vision of Grid computing is one of building complex systems from dynamically 
assembled individual, distributed resources, and bridging across organisational and technical 
boundaries. Like the Web, Grid users are presented with an abstraction of seamless access to 
resources, but to distributed computation and services as well as distributed data. In the Grid 
vision, these resources may be composed to carry out complex functions on behalf of users, 
without users having to know where they are or how they are provided. Technically, a 
resource can be almost anything digital: a large-scale supercomputer, a computational service, 
a database or an instrument collecting in real time. In complex applications, numerous such 
resources get tied together to provide a particular function. Because these resources are 
defined in a machine readable form, in principle, Grid users need only provide a high-level 
description of what they require and middleware will find resources that match and compose 
them appropriately. It is the relative simplicity of these abstractions that enables Grid 
middleware to be widely applicable and support a vast range of applications.  
Complex ensembles of diverse, distributed resources belonging to different administrative 
domains create challenges for infrastructure management and use: resources and services may 
change over time, resources may become temporarily or permanently unavailable; services 
may not behave in the expected fashion and causes may need to be diagnosed and fixed. Such 
events can lead to a number of difficulties for ensuring the infrastructure remains in ‘working 
order’. For example, users might want to make judgements about when a service might 
resume; system administrators have the problem of understanding the relationships between 
observed behaviour and complex configurational data, Grid support staff need to diagnose 
and fix faults. In addition, resources are normally managed under local arrangements within 
the organisations that own them and will be subject to different policies and conditions of use. 
Furthermore, they will often be used by local as well as remote users, be part of multiple 
virtual organisations and may have more than one purpose (e.g., academic lab resources may 
be used for both course work and running simulations for research). 
The Grid is not an end in itself but an enabler of the e-Research vision of large scale and 
collaborative scientific investigation through the agency of virtual organisations. This raises 
the question to what extent the workings of a virtual organisation (VO) need to be made 
                                                 
7 Just one example of the use of social recommender techniques. 
8 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4237338.stm 
accountable to individuals involved in these collaborations. In conventional settings, 
collaboration is supported through the affordances of physical spaces. In her study of 
scientific practice in conventional research settings, Knorr-Cetina (1999) observes that 
“Laboratories are now collective units that encapsulate within them a traffic of substances, 
materials, equipment and observations … The traffic of objects, researchers and information 
produces a lifeworld within which laboratories are locales” (p.39). Physical places afford 
opportunities for collaborators to observe what’s going on, remain informed of relevant 
developments and coordinate their activities. It is through such interactions that researchers 
are able to work up the trust that is essential for collaboration to be effective. 
As with the Web, thinking of the Grid as supporting a populated, social and collaborative 
space raises many interesting issues for how these VOs may be represented so as to make 
activity within them observable and accountable, and thereby afford awareness and 
understanding among their members. We can think of VOs as not only binding together 
researchers, but also administrators and technical support staff collaborating to provide 
trustable, dependable and useful services (Bowers, 1994; Rogers, 1992) and share resources. 
We are interested in how VOs, as populated spaces, as ensembles of technologies and people, 
might be made tangible through collaborative affordances (ways of making available rules for 
involvement, making those involved accountable to those rules, and making those involved 
and their activities visible to other participants) and how operational information might be 
made usefully available to Grid administrators, technical support staff and end users. That is, 
in addition to monitoring the status of the various technical resources that underpin a VO, 
there is a question of users maintaining an awareness of what others are doing in the context 
of the VO and how it relates to their own work. 
If VOs are to support collaboration effectively, then we need to consider how Grids might 
afford not only interaction in the context of environments designed explicitly for 
collaboration9 but also how it can serve as a resource for researchers maintaining awareness 
of relevant events happening within the VO of which they are members. Accountability 
issues that arise might include trusting remote sites to run applications or to host data 
securely. For example, de Paul et al. (2005) have been examining how people’s sharing of 
data can be made accountable through visual representations of file use. Our recent research 
suggests that there are a number of issues for accountability regarding data sharing in e-
Science – e.g., data quality and confidentiality – which we need to understand and to provide 
affordances for in distributed research environments (Jirotka et al., 2005).  
Account Resources and Accountability: Some Examples 
In this section we examine examples of various attempts to provide account resources to 
explain system behaviour, including ways in which the behaviour of the Grid is currently 
monitored and how users can use this data to make operational decisions.  
Firewalls 
Firewalls provide an interesting example of how Web behaviour becomes an accountable 
issue and how current solutions may not always be satisfactory as warrants for users to ‘trust’ 
the system. The following example demonstrates the implementation of system security 
policy for potentially problematic Internet transactions (Anderson et al., 2003). In Figure 1, 
we see what we might call a ‘level one’ account resource of a situation in which the user is 
                                                 
9 For example, Access Grids provide sophisticated video conference facilities for formal collaborative settings such as 
meetings. See http://www.accessgrid.org 
called upon to make a decision: a firewall has produced an alert concerning an application’s 
attempt to access the Internet. Clearly, access to the Internet for downloading or uploading 
data to/from the system can be an accountable matter for system security. The firewall’s 
implementation of policy with respect to these transactions is statically configured and 
involves calling upon the user to decide if access requests are appropriate and can be 
proceeded with. 
 
Figure 1: An example of a ‘level one’ account resource. 
Figure 2 shows the ‘level two’ account resource produced in response to the user’s request for 
more information. Note that the policy implementation requires user involvement since the 
firewall software cannot by itself determine if the transaction is to be viewed as a safe one. It 
is expected that the user has responsibility for deciding whether the transaction should be 
continued, and that the user has the requisite knowledge to decide whether the remote site is a 
trustworthy, whether the transaction is legitimate for this application and so on. Thus, 
implementation of the policy can be thought of as partial, requiring the user to ‘fill in the 
gaps’ on the occasion of its application. 
 
Figure 2: A ‘level two’ account resource derived from the level one account resource in 
Figure 1. 
What the firewall system dialogues offer are account resources at two ‘levels’ of description. 
The ‘level one’ account resource informs that there is some action required and gives some 
basic details. The ‘level two’ account resource furnishes further details about the nature of the 
transaction at a protocol level. The level two account resource is intended to help a user reach 
a decision about whether or not to allow the transaction to proceed, but unless the user has 
prior knowledge of the trustworthiness or otherwise of the given www site or is able to spot 
irregularities in the details of the transaction, then such account resources will be of little use. 
The account resource omits, for example, a description of why it was necessary for the 
application to make this particular transaction at this particular time. An improved basis for 
decision-making might be afforded by the firewall accounting for the context of the 
transaction: has the message appeared in response to the user’s action or due to some 
background process? Is this a legitimate transaction for this application at this time? What are 
the potential consequences of the transaction? 
Grid Security 
A prime example of the problem of providing adequate account resources is Grid security 
which is often realised through a public key infrastructure (PKI). On the one hand there is the 
need to reduce the complexity of managing trust relationships, which currently often involves 
manual handling of X.509 certificates (Beckles, Welch and Basney 2005). There are a 
number of problems associated with this, not least problems associated with keeping private 
keys secure10, managing a PKI configuration, potentially on a large number of computers 
(e.g., then users are mobile and use multiple machines), and managing certificate revocation 
lists. There is some evidence that the complexity of managing a PKI leads some people to 
take shortcuts such as sharing certificates, raising serious security issues (e.g., Balfanz et al. 
2004). Also, as Beckles, Welch and Basney (2005) point out, Grid services often ‘fail closed’:  
“This tends to make grid security configurations rather brittle, as a small error can cause all 
security operations to fail. Combining this with users who are not (and do not wish to be) 
experts in grid security configurations results in a significant usability issue” (ibid., p. 78). 
A number of approaches exist that provide a management environment that allows the 
complexities of the PKI to be hidden from end users by providing a façade that makes the 
Grid more easily usable under normal circumstances and leaves the complexity of the 
underlying Grid security infrastructure to be managed by Grid engineers and systems 
administration staff. Examples are PKIBoot (Gutmann 2003), MyProxy (Basney, Humphrey 
and Welch) or SACRED (Arsenault and Ferrell 2001, Gustafson, Just and Nystrom 2004).  
The idea is to establish a ‘single-sign-on’ environment where a user can authenticate once 
using a simple username and password combination and then access any Grid resources they 
are authorised to use without needing to worry about the ways in which they are authenticated 
to remote systems. Grid portals are popular ways to providing the user interface for this 
façade. While we would applaud this development, there is the question what happens in 
those circumstances when, for one reason or another, circumstances are ‘other than normal’. 
For example, Beckles, Welch and Basney point out that: 
                                                 
10 Beckles, Welche and Basney (2005) describe the implications of poor visibility of 
arrangements on security, pointing out that users may accidentally store private keys on 
network storage since some systems make the use of networked storage space transparent (i.e. 
invisible) to the user. This opens up the possibility that security might be put at risk if no 
additional measures such as encryption of the key or the network filesystem traffic are used. 
“Clear, robust error reporting is vital to making such an architecture viable, particularly since 
the underlying security protocols are unfamiliar to most users. If credentials are being 
generated ‘‘on-the-fly’’, then the time this takes may be sufficiently long that the user will 
worry that nothing is happening unless they are assured otherwise or presented with some 
method of gauging progress” (ibid. p.90). 
This example shows that while the provision of a simple abstraction or façade can help 
improve the usability of Grid technologies, there is a need for users to be able to query what 
lies beyond the immediately visible surface. 
Grid Scheduling 
yesterday/today/tmrw – include TG environment stuff 
  
Users don’t always know what they want 
 Reporting of node load on queued systems 
 Measuring available memory 
 Measuring available disk 
Wolski- last value is often the worst guess 
 
Figure 4: An example of a Grid monitoring tool. 
Account Resources and Accountability: Discussion 
We see from the preceding discussion that while abstractions are useful tools for protecting 
users from unnecessary details of system behaviour, rigid adherence to a single abstraction 
may deny users the information they need to act effectively. As Dourish writes:  
“In just the same way as they approach all other activities, they (users) need to be able to 
decide what to do in order to get things done. In everyday interaction ... accountability is the 
key feature that enables them to do this. The way that activities are organised makes their 
nature available to others; they can be seen and inspected, observed and reported. But this 
feature … is exactly what is hidden by software abstractions ... information about how the 
system is doing what it does, how the perceived action is organised.” (Dourish, 2001: 83) 
The question is how do users construct, achieve or make sense of the behaviour of complex 
infrastructure and its users, and how can we design accountability into it? According to 
Dourish (2001): 
“First we need to find a way to ensure that the account that is offered of the system’s 
behaviour – a representation of that behaviour – is strongly connected to the behaviour that it 
describes ... Second, we need to find a way to allow this representation to be tied to the action 
in such a way that the account emerges along with the action rather than separately from it ... 
Third, we need to ensure that the account that is offered is an account of the current specific 
behaviour of the system.” (Dourish, 2001:85) 
To answer this question in the context of Grids, we must take into consideration a number of 
issues. First, account resources of and for Grid behaviour must satisfy the needs of a wide 
variety of different users. These differences reflect different user roles (e.g., operational 
support staff and infrastructure administrators) and different end-user communities. Second, 
accounts for these users may lie anywhere within what we might refer to as a ‘spectrum of 
virtuality’ (see Figure 3) which extends from complete observability (and complete user 
control) of behaviour at one extreme to complete transparency of behaviour (and lack of user 
control) at the other. Third, what serves as an adequate account resource of and for Grid 
behaviour will vary with time, both in the real-time context of interaction and over time as 
users become more experienced and expert.  
The combination of these factors means, of course, that any attempt to identify a priori a 
finite set of accounts must fail. As we saw with the firewall example, the ‘designed for’ 
layered account resource has a finite depth and extent; if, when the user has reached the last 
account resource, the explanation is still not adequate, the user is still unable to make a 
decision. Of course, it is relatively easy (technically) to supply account resources with 
increasing depth, but it is more difficult to increase the extent (or ‘breadth’) of the account 
resource, that is, to relate what the application might be trying to achieve, the implications of 
this in the context of the user’s activity, location, and so on, until users have sufficient 
resources to assemble an account that is relevant to their needs at that moment. Instead, we 
must look to ways in which users can define and construct their own accounts.  
A possible solution is to consider providing flexible tools that will enable users to mine 
relevant data and visualise it in easy-to-understand ways.  
 
Figure 3: The ‘spectrum of virtuality’. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
When we talk about accountability we do not intend to suggest that Grids can produce 
accounts in the ways that society members do – they can only provide the resources for the 
work of assembling an account that has to be done by people. When we say ‘provide the 
resources’ for an account we mean to suggest that the modelling of, for example, the system 
state, the network connection or who has been downloading files from the server are ‘docile’ 
– i.e. they cannot be queried in the manner that one might query a human. The docility of 
accounts produced by systems is one reason for our suggestion that they not be seen as 
accounts in themselves (if they were they would be rather impoverished accounts) but 
materials that are constitutive of accounts when assembled, queried, and so forth. As with 
Garfinkel’s clinical records, they do not speak for themselves but have to be made to speak 
(as it were) by their users – hence our suggestion that they are resources as opposed to fully-
fledged accounts. We might want to think of the difference between accounts as produced by 
systems and those from humans as, to use Button et al’s (ref) excellent metaphor, the 
difference between plastic and real flowers. While the plastic flowers may have some of the 
same aesthetic appeal of the real, they are deficient in a number of ways – they are imitations 
that may be good enough for the front desk in the office, but we should not expect them to 
exhibit the features of regular flowers (odour, for example). This relates also to the ambitions 
of artificial intelligence – the ambition to produce ‘expert systems’ and the like is, we would 
argue, akin to the production of plastic flowers – they may look the part and perform some of 
the functions of the real expert, but they do not always pass muster in the manner that an 
expert might be expected to do. It is this essential fragility, born of the fact that these are not 
fully-fledged experts, flowers or in our case accounts that is important for us. There may be a 
for our purposes adequacy to an account produced by a system, but to enquire further exposes 
the essential fragility of the account. 
To return to Dourish’s comments, above, we would argue that his notion of accounts offered 
by systems are (mere) representations of their behaviour – they are by no means all that could 
be said or that we might want to have said. Dourish rightly points to the reflexive tie between 
accounts and actions described by those accounts – again this points to the use of accounts as 
a resource (in our case for the production of human accounts).  Finally, we should also attend 
to what it is that the accounts are accounts of – what an account describes may be some high 
level process that does not speak to our concerns or the obverse (i.e. too low a level to be of 
any utility). This directs our attention to the central point – accounts are about furnishing the 
resources to allow one to engage in doing something or other (e.g. seeing that a router needs 
repairing, spotting an intrusion or logging who has used our data). In short, it is the 
‘aboutness’ of accounts that makes them useful. 
What an account is about is fundamental to its utility – this is a commonplace – but how it is 
about a particular thing in the world is also central, and again it is here that, to our minds, the 
systems available seem (albeit inevitably) to fall down. The visibility arrangements of system 
behaviour are often impoverished and can be seen as generative of their own problem space. 
Envisioning both operation of and collaboration in e-science systems will remain problematic 
unless and until (although we are sceptical as to the second part) a more usable system for 
accounting for system behaviour can be assembled. There will, in short, inevitably be the 
need for some repair. 
While we don’t dispute that we must discover ways of enabling use of the Grid to become 
progressively more routine, we do not equate this with the Grid disappearing behind some 
high level abstraction. The behaviour of systems must be accountable and we need to 
understand how to achieve this for different kinds of user.  
References 
Adams, A. and Sasse, M. A. (1999). Users Are Not The Enemy: Why users compromise 
computer security mechanisms and how to take remedial measures. Communications of the 
ACM 42(12), pp. 40-46. 
Anderson, S., Hartswood, M., Procter, R., Rouncefield, M., Slack, R., Soutter, J. and Voss, A. 
(2003). Making Autonomic Computing Systems Accountable: The Problem of Human-
Computer Interaction. In Proc 1st Int Workshop on Autonomic Computing Systems, 14th 
International Conference on Database and Expert Systems Applications, Prague, 
September. 
Arsenault, A. and Ferrell, S. (2001). Securely Available Credentials – Requirements, IETF 
RFC 3157. 
Balfanz, D., Durfee, G., Grinter, R. E. and Smetters, D.K. (2004). In Search of Usable 
Security: Five Lessons from the Field. IEEE Security & Privacy 2(5), pp. 19-24. 
Basney, J., Humphrey, M. and Welch, V. (2005). The MyProxy online credential repository. 
Software – Practice and Experience 35, pp. 801-816. 
Beckles, B., Welch, V. and Basney, J. (2005). Mechanisms for increasing the usability of grid 
security. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 63, pp. 74-101. 
Bowers, J. (1994). The Work of Making the Network Work: Studying CSCW in Action. In 
Proc. ACM CSCW conference.  
Dourish, P. (2001). Where the Action Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction. MIT 
Press. 
de Paula, R., Ding, X., Dourish, P.,  Nies, K., Pillet, B., Redmiles, D., Ren, J., Rode, J. and 
Silva Filho, R. (2005). In the Eye of the Beholder: A Visualization-baseed Approach to 
System Security. Int. J. Human-Computer Studies. 
Ganek, A. and Corbi, T. (2003). The dawning of the autonomic computing era. IBM Systems 
Journal. 43(1); pp. 5-18. 
Gustafson, D., Just, M. and Nystrom, M. (2004). Securely Available Credentials (SACRED) - 
Credential Server Framework. IETF RFC 3760. 
 
Gutmann, P. (2003). Plug-and-Play PKI: A PKI your Mother can Use. 12th USENIX Security 
Symposium, Washington. http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/usenix03.pdf  
 
Hardian, B., Indulska, J. and Henricksen, K. (2006). Balancing Autonomy and User Control 
in Context-Aware Systems – a Survey. Fourth Annual IEEE International Conference on 
Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops (PERCOMW'06), pp. 51-56 
Jirotka, M., Procter, R., Hartswood, M., Slack, R., Coopmans, C., Hinds, C. and Voss, A. 
(2005). Collaboration and Trust in Healthcare Innovation: the eDiaMoND Case Study. 
Journal of Computer-Supported Cooperative Work, 14(4), p. 369-389. 
Kesselman, C. and Foster, I. (1998). The Grid: Blueprint for a New Computing Infrastructure. 
Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999). Epistemic Cultures. How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Harvard 
University Press. 
Rogers, Y. (1992). Ghosts in the Network: Distributed Troubleshooting in a Shared Working 
Environment. In Proc. ACM CSCW conference, November. 
Stanyer, D. and Procter, R. (1999). Improving Web Usability with the Link Lens. In 
Mendelzon, A. et al. (Eds.), Journal of Computer Networks and ISDN Systems, Vol. 31, 
Proceedings of the Eighth International WWW Conference, Toronto, May. Elsevier, pp. 
455-66.  
